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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States was once a one-of-a-kind capital market.
No other country offered securities markets of comparable size,
sophistication, or liquidity. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC"), the agency responsible for regulating the U.S.
securities markets,2 was free to establish rules and requirements
secure in the knowledge that issuers and investors who objected
to the regulations "could not find non-SEC-regulated substitute
markets at reasonable cost."3  Today, however, although the
United States remains the preeminent capital market in the
world,4 there are other markets companies and investors can turn
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' See Joseph A. Grundfest, Zen and the Art of Securities Regulation, in
MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992)
(noting that historically no substitute markets existed at a reasonable cost, and
thus there were no "practical substitutes") [hereinafter MODERNIZING U.S.
SECURITIES REGULATIONS].
2 The SEC was established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. S 78b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For more information on the SEC, see
Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to
U.S. Markets, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S97 (1994).
3 Grundfest, supra note 1, at 4.
4 See William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of
Foreign Security Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, in MODERNIZING U.S.
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to for their capital and investment needs.' For example, the
United Kingdom and Japan both have well-established markets,
and other nations, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have
securities markets that, while relatively new, are attracting
growing numbers of issuers and investors.6
Still, the existence of other markets is not enough to threaten
the dominant position of the U.S. securities markets. As with
other goods and services, international trade can exist only if there
are links between markets that allow buyers and sellers to
interconnect. Certainly, businesses generally have become
increasingly globalized, as demonstrated by NAFTA, the Uruguay
round of GATT, the European Union, and the rapid development
of the Pacific Rim nations.7 This globalization - also known as
internationalization - has been and continues to be reflected in
the globalization of the world's securities markets.8 In fact, the
pace of internationalization in the securities world has been even
greater than the rate of growth in international trade generally.9
U.S. investors are investing in non-U.S. securities in record
numbers0 and foreign companies are listing their securities in the
SECURITIES REGULATIONS, supra note 1, at 39-40 (remarking that U.S. securities
markets "continue to hold the lead among international financial markets"); see
also Pat McConnell, Practical Company Experience in Entering U.S. Markets:
Significant Issues and Hurdles from the Advisor's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L
L.U. S120, S127 (1994) (observing that the United States has the "largest equity
capital market in the world").
s See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 4.
6 See Singapore Aimsfor Big League, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 10,
1996, at 5 (discussing the future of the Singapore Stock Exchange).
7 See generally Richard C. Breeden, The Globalization of Law and Business
in the 1990s, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (1993) (discussing the globalization
of business generally, financial markets specifically, and resultant law-related
policy issues).
' See Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the International-
ization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United
States, the European Community, anaGermany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 565,
565 (1994).
9 See RICHARD HERRING & ROBERT LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN
THE GLOBAL ECoNOMY (1994), reprinted in HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A.
WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND
REGULATION 10 (2d ed. 1995).
10 See Ste phen Davis, The Allure ofADRs, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept.
1994, at 109 (reporting that trading volume in American Depositary Receipts
has tripled since 1990); Jack O'Hara, Global Investments Can Provide Value a'nd
Diversity, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 20, 1993, at 6 (stating that during 1992,
Americans bought and sold 33% more stock than in 1991); Cheryl B. Strauss,
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United States at a record level. 1 The extent of globalization of
capital markets has reached levels some commentators describe as
"revolutionary."12
Some commentators question whether the United States can
maintain its dominant position in the face of global competition.
Regulatory requirements make trading on the U.S. exchanges and
on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System ("NASDAQ") expensive, and some commenta-
tors fear that as the foreign exchanges improve, the lower costs
associated with listing on those exchanges will attract listings away
from the United States. 3 Currently, foreign companies that
want to list their securities on any of the U.S. exchanges 14 or on
NASDAQ 15 must comply with the U.S. securities laws, which
have the world's most burdensome registration and reporting
requirements.16 It is not, however, the registration and reporting
requirements per se that are the most controversial aspects of the
securities regulations. The weight of the criticism is leveled at the
requirement that issuers either prepare their financial disclosures
in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples ("U.S. GAAP") or reconcile them with U.S. GAAP. l7 This
Do U.S. Investors Need More Foreign Listings?, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
Nov. 1992, at 16 (noting that between 1990-1992, U.S. investors increased their
holdings of foreign stocks by 62%).
" See William Glasgall & Dave Lindorff, The Global Investor, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 19, 1994, at 96, 97 (noting that the once arcane American Depositary
Receipts are multiplying "at a ferocious pace"). The growth in the market for
American Depository Receipts ("ADRs") presents a sharp contrast to just a few
years ago, when investor interest in international equities was "barely apparent"
and the only international offerings consisted of issues from South African gold
mines, a few European multinationals, and "a smattering of other quirky
issues." Id. at 99.
12 See Roquette, supra note 8, at 565.
13 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of listing on U.S. exchanges,
see infra section 3.1.
14 The term "exchanges" refers to the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, and local exchanges.
15 The NASDAQ is a computerized system that provides updated price
quotations (i.e., bids and offers). See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 618-20 (3d ed. 1995). Dealers
use the exchange to find the best prices and then execute the transaction by
phone. See id.
16 See discussion infra section 2.3.
17 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 4, at S126-27 (stating that reconciling
disclosures with U.S. GAAP is a lengthy process and that acquiring the
1996]
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is an expensive and time-consuming process that many commenta-
tors believe disadvantages U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ relative
to the world's other exchanges.'" As the foreign exchanges
improve, the lower costs of foreign exchanges may attract listings
away from the U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ.
This Comment analyzes whether the United States should
maintain its current regulatory requirements or whether it should
seek to reform its laws in an effort to retain its competitive
position in the global capital market. Section 2 of this Comment
explains why investors and the U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ
want foreign stock listings, the means by which U.S. investors
invest in foreign stocks, and the current regulations by which
foreign securities must abide. After a brief introduction to the
basic economics of securities regulations, Section 3 of this
Comment compares the arguments of those who support the
status quo with the arguments of those who support modifying
the regulatory requirements that apply to foreign securities.
Section 4 argues that the regulations need to be modified and
suggests several alternatives to the current regulatory scheme.
This Comment concludes that the SEC must implement regula-
tions that ease the burden on foreign companies that want to list
on the U.S. exchanges in order to remain competitive in the
global financial market.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Why U.S. Listings of Foreign Companies Matter
2.1.1. Securities Regulations and the U.S. Exchanges and
NASDAQ
The U.S. capital market is a vital part of the nation's econo-
my, particularly the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), the
American Stock Exchange ("Amex"), and NASDAQ. The U.S.
exchanges, NASDAQ, and the SEC all want to maintain the
United States' position as the preeminent financial market in the
necessary data can be difficult).
18 For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in reconciliation with U.S.
GAAP, see infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. But see McConnell, supra
note 4, at S122 (opining that compliance with SEC regulations is not an
obstacle to foreign companies wishing to list securities in the United States).
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world, but opinions vary over what - if anything - must be
done in order to do so.'9 If the United States is unable to
maintain its competitive edge in the midst of growing internation-
alization, it will lose its investment banking activities, which
employ "some of the most talented... individuals in the global
business community," as well as the substantial international
influence wielded by the country with the title of "global financial
capital."2'
2.1.2. Investor Interest in Foreign Stocks
Two types of investors exist in the market: retail investors
and institutional investors.2' In the past, retail investors were the
driving force behind the U.S. securities markets.' In recent
years, however, there has been a major increase in the role of
institutional investors.' By 1990, institutional investors held
fifty-three percent of the value of publicly-traded U.S. equity 4
and accounted for over seventy percent of the volume of U.S.-
traded securities." This trend is important to bear in mind
when evaluating U.S. securities regulations because "rules and
regulations that might be quite attractive in markets dominated by
retail investors can lead to substantial inefficiencies and distortions
in markets composed of sophisticated institutional investors."26
It also is important to consider why investors want to invest
in foreign securities. First, international stocks can reduce the risk
'9 See discussion infra section 3.
20 Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On Trading Foreign Securities in U.S. Markets, in
MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS, supra note 1, at 77, 80-81.
21 Retail investors are individual investors. Institutional investors are
entities such as insurance companies, investment companies, pension funds, and
trust departments that ivestlarge sums in the securities mrkets. See DAVID
L. ScOTT, WALL STREET WORDS 178-79 (1988).
" As late as 1975, retail investors dominated share holdings, owning 70%
of total equities outstanding. See J. William Hicks, Secunties Regulation:
Challenges in the Decades Ahead, 68 IND. L.J. 791, 794 (1993).
' See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that this trend alone
challenges the current U.S. securities laws, which were designed for a market
characterized by the small, individual retail investor).
24 See Hicks, supra note 22, at 794.
25 See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 7.
26 Id.
19961
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of an investor's portfolio.' Since the 1950s, basic portfolio
theory has held that the risk of a portfolio of securities is less than
the risk of the individual securities constituting the portfolio."
Adding foreign securities to the portfolio can reduce risk even
further because the returns of foreign securities have a relatively
low correlation with the returns of U.S. securities.29 The Nikkei
average, for example, has shown a very low correlation with the
Standard & Poor's 500-stock index ("S&P 500") over the last five
years, as have the markets in Malaysia, Portugal, Spain, and
Switzerland. 0
Second, foreign securities can increase investors' returns. In
1995, the U.S. securities markets grew explosively,3 while
foreign stock markets were "nowhere nearly as spectacular as the
U.S. market." 2 Prior to 1995, however, many foreign securities
markets were outperforming the U.S. markets. The United States
has been among the top five performing markets in the world
only four times in the last thirteen years.3 A 1994 study
compared a price index of 215 ADRs3' from twenty-six countries
to the S&P 500 and found that the ADRs had outperformed the
Investors commonly hold many different securities, and these combined
holdings are referred to as a portfolio. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 129-174 (4th ed.
1991).
"8 See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). Diversifica-
tion can be explained loosely as not putting all your eggs in one basket. More
comprehensively, diversification eliminates the risk peculiar to a company
(unique risk) because while most stocks are more variable than the market itself
is, holding several stocks reduces the overall variability of the portfolio. See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 27, at 129-74. This benefit does not improve
significantly if a portfolio holds more than 20 to 30 stocks. See id. at 137.
29 See Smith, supra note 20, at 77.
3 See Glasgall & Lindorff, supra note 11, at 97-98 (examining data from
Morningstar, Inc., a Chicago financial research house).
" The Dow Jones Industrial Average grew "a whopping" 33.45% in 1995.
Molly Baker, Review of the Stock Market: Most Sectors Found it Hard to Fail...
But Not All, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at R4.
32 See James Welsh, The World in Your Hands: Investment Expert Sees Shift
in Profits to Overseas Markets, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 28, 1996, at C1.
" See O'Hara, supra note 10, at 6 (stating that the United States was among
the top five markets only three times in the last 12 years).
ADRs are essentially proxies for foreign stocks. See discussion infra
section 2.2.
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S&P 500 by twenty-five percent since 1992.35 A promising
foreign stock such as that of Swiss food-maker Nestle illustrates
why foreign stocks are popular. Nestle was expected to increase
earnings more than eight percent in 1994, yet it sells at only
fourteen times earnings; this in contrast to the U.S. corporation
Procter & Gamble Co., which trades at seventeen times earn-
ings.3
6
2.2. Investing in Foreign Stocks
ADRs have existed since 1927 when Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company invented the ADR as a way to permit Americans to
invest in Selfridge's Ltd., a London retailer.37  It has only been
in the last decade, and particularly in the last few years, however,
that the ADR has emerged as a widely utilized trading vehicle.3
ADRs are now the most common means by which U.S. investors
trade foreign equity securities.39
If an investor wants to purchase a foreign security by way of
an ADR, she tells her broker, who then requests the overseas
branch of the firm, or any other securities dealer within the
issuer's home country, to purchase the desired number of
shares. 4° Then the U.S. branch of the brokerage firm issues
receipts representing the shares.41  Selling the shares simply
involves reversing the procedure. 42 Today, however, because of
the great number of ADRs already trading in the United States,
an investor (or rather, the investor's broker) rarely has to follow
this procedure. Instead, brokers simply match trades from their
own supply of ADRs or, if necessary, buy from (or sell to) other
firms. 43
ADRs can be traded on an exchange, on NASDAQ, or in the
electronic over-the-counter market, which is commonly referred
" See Glasgall & Lindorff, supra note 11, at 97 (reporting a study by
Markus E. Barth, a senior analyst at Merrill Lynch & Co.).
16 See id. at 98.
17 See id. at 99.
3s See id. at 97.
31 See id. at 96-97.
40 See id. at 100.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
1996]
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to as the pink sheet market due to the color of the paper on
which securities orders were originally presented." ADRs carry
the same voting rights as the stocks they represent. 4 They also
allow the holder to participate in rights offerings if the offering is
registered with the SEC." If the offering is not registered, the
bank holding the ADR sells the rights overseas and remits the
profits to the investor.47
ADRs are popular because they are more liquid, less expensive,
and easier to trade than foreign stocks themselves.4' ADRs also
have the advantage of trading in dollars, which makes the trades
easier to monitor.49 In sum, "ADRs look, act, and smell like
U.S. stock certificates." 0 Investors can invest directly overseas
but the rules for doing so are archaic, complex, and inconve-
nient.51 Thus, the "vast majority" of foreign securities trading
within the United States do so via ADRs.52
ADRs traded on the exchanges or NASDAq are required to conform
with both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 154; see also discussion infra section
2.3.
41 See Glasgall & Lindorff, supra note 11, at 100.
4See id.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 97.
49 See id. The fact that ADRs are traded in dollars, however, does not
mean that there is no currency risk. Currency risk may be the biggest danger
in trading foreign stocks, and ADRs do nothing whatsoever to eliminate that
risk. For example, assume: (1) a Japanese company, X, whose stock trades at
10,000 yen; and (2) an exchange rate of 100 yen to the dollar. With these
numbers, X's ADRs will sell for $100 per share. Now, assume the value of a
share of X rises by 25% in Japan. If the exchange rate remains constant, X's
ADR will appreciate by 25% to $125. On the other hand, if the yen
depreciates to 125 yen to the dollar, X's ADR will not rise at all. If the yen
falls even further, the ADR would actually decrease in value.
50 William E. Decker, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to
Foreign Issuers and the Alternative Methods ofAccessing the U.S. Markets. From the
Issuer's Perspective, 17 FoRDHAm INT'L U.. S10, S13 (1994).
"i See Glasgall & Lindorff, supra note 11, at 99. To invest directly overseas,
the investor as to open a foreign bank account, pay large brokerage
commissions, high foreign exchange charges, and sizeable local taxes. See id.
Alternatively, the investor can go through a U.S. broker but this too is
expensive because brokers charge high fees in order to recover the costs listed
above. See id. Most brokers also require a $25,000 minimum on all orders
bought or sold. See id.
52 See Decker, supra note 50, at S13.
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Qualified Institutional Buyers ("QIBs")53 have the additional
option of purchasing privately placed foreign stocks. QIBs are
defined under Rule 144A of the Securities Act as institutions that
own or manage a portfolio of securities valued at more than $100
million (excluding securities already traded on a national exchange
or on NASDAQ).m  Private placement eliminates the need to
register under section 5 of the Securities Act,5" which can reduce
costs by up to two-thirds, as well as the continuous reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act,5" which saves additional
CoStS.
57
2.3. Foreign Securities Offerings and Compliance with U.S.
Securities Regulation
A foreign company that wants its shares to trade or wants to
conduct an offering in the United States can choose any of three
options: (1) conduct a private sale via Rule 144A of the Securities
Act; (2) list its ADRs in the pink sheet market; or (3) list on one
of the exchanges or on NASDAQ." ADRs listed in the pink
sheet market are known as Level-One ADRs; ADRs listed on an
exchange or quoted on NASDAQ are referred to as Level-Two
ADRs; and ADRs that are used to issue new equity are sometimes
referred to as Level-Three ADRs. 9
The vast bulk of ADRs are traded in the electronic pink sheet
market.' The pink sheet market is popular because it allows a
foreign security to trade in the U.S. market at a lower cost than
an exchange or NASDAQ listing.61 Level-One ADRs are less
expensive to register for trading because the pink sheet market is
11 See 17 C.F.R. S 230.144A(a)(1) (1995) (defining the term "qualified
institutional buyer"); see also Roquette, supra note 8, at 582-83 (discussing the
statutory definition of "qualified institutional buyer").
54 See 17 C.F.R. S 230.144A(a)(1).
55 See infra note 72.
56 See infra note 73.
57 See Roquette, supra note 8, at 585.
58 See Decker, supra note 50, at S13-20.
s See Davis, supra note 10, at 110; Strauss, supra note 10, at 18.
o See Strauss, supra note 10, at 18.
61 One advantage of being inexpensive is that foreign companies can use the
pink sheet market to test demand for their securities. See id. if an ADR fizzles
on the pink sheet market, it may not be worth the price of listing on an
exchange or NASDAQ. See id.
1996]
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significantly less regulated than the exchanges and NASDAQ.62
Level-One ADRs can trade in the United States upon the filing of
an F-6 registration, which requires only the names of the company
and the depositary bank. 6  The reporting requirements for
trading unlisted ADRs are equally simple. The company only has
to furnish the same information that it provides to authorities and
shareholders in its home country.' A Level-One ADR can be
formed and traded within eight weeks.65
There are, however, disadvantages to trading in the pink sheet
market. The pink sheet market offers no volume reporting, 66 no
last-sale reporting, 67 and no real time quotes. 6' Furthermore,
very little easily accessible financial information exists about the
companies whose securities are represented by the pink sheet
ADRs.69 Overall, the pink sheet market is a less transparent, less
liquid, and less regulated means of trading foreign equities. In the
words of one industry researcher, "'[a] fund manager's nightmare
is holding an unlisted ADR and being unable to get a price when
something goes wrong.'" 70
Moving from a Level-One ADR program to a Level-Two
ADR program is a significant step, for Level-Two ADRs must
conform with U.S. securities laws (with a limited number of
exceptions discussed below). There are seven related but separate
statutes governing federal securities law in the United States. 71
62 See id.
63 See 17 C.F.R. S 239.36 (authorizing the use of Form F-6).
See id. 240.12(g)(3)-2(b)(1) (exempting certain foreign issuers from the
reporting requirements of§ 12(g) of the Securities Act).
"5 See Davis, supra note 10, at 110.
66 See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign
Firms Appropriate?, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S61 (1994). Volume reporting
refers to the number of shares of the security traded on a daily, monthly, or
yearly basis. See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 381.
67 See Franklin R. Edwards, SEC Requirements for Trading of Foreign
Securities on U.S. Exchanges, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS,
supra note 1, at 57, 62. Last-sale is the price at which the security last traded.
See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 192.
61 See Cochrane, supra note 66, at S61. Real time quotes list the price at
which offerors of the security are currently willing to sell.
69 See Edwards, supra note 67, at 62.
70 Davis, supra note 10, at 111.
71 The seven securities statutes are: the Securities Act of 1933; the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939; the Investment Company Act of 1940;
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For the purposes of this Comment, however, only two are
important: the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")72 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 73
The Securities Act requires registration with the SEC.74
Registration in turn requires certain financial disclosures. 5 The
Securities Act also prohibits fraud and deception in the offering of
securities. 76 The Securities Act primarily governs the distribu-
tion of securities and thus is important to foreign companies only
if they wish to participate in a public offering in the United
States. 7
If a foreign company has a registered security trading in the
United States, or if a foreign company wants to list an already
existing stock, it must comply with the Exchange Act. The
Exchange Act requires continuous reporting and disclosures7
and, like the Securities Act, contains a general prohibition against
fraudulent practices.79
Both Acts require companies from other countries to provide
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; and the Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1975. See generally Loss & SEUIGMAN, supra note 15, at 33-47 (briefly ex-
plaining the function of each act).
72 See 15 U.S.C. S 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
73 See id. S 78a-78kk.
4 Section 5 of the Securities Act requires users to register their securities
prior to any offers to buy, offers to sell, siles, confirmation of sales, or delivery
of securities. See id. S 78b. The SEC is the administrative agency responsible
for enforcing the federal securities laws and has the additional charge of
formulating rules that further the effectiveness of the securities laws. See
Kosnik, supra note 2, at S97. The mission of the SEC can be summarized as
a "mandate to ensure the integrity of the markets and the protection of
investors." Id. The SEC was established by the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. S 78d (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
.' See 15 U.S.C. S 77g (listing the information that is required in the
registration statement); i. S 77aa (listing the schedule of information that is
required in the registration statement).
76 See S 12(a)(2), 11, & 17(a) of the Securities Act at 15 U.S.C. % 77k,
771(2), & 77q(a).
77 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 34.
78 Section 12 of the Exchange Act establishes registration and reporting
requirements. See 15 U.S.C. S 781(g). Sections 13 and 15(d) require peridical
ana other reports. See id. § 78m, o(d). Foreign companies qhat fHle "home
country" reports are exempt from the registration requirements of S 12(. See
17 C.F.R. 5 12(g)(3)-2. The reporting requirements, therefore, are generally
limited to companies that trade on one of the exchanges or NASDAQ.
71 See 15 U.S.C. 5 78i(b).
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greater disclosure than they are required to provide in their home
countries: the United States has the most highly regulated
exchanges in the world. 0 The U.S. securities laws also provide
for greater liability in cases of fraud and insider trading.81
Finally, and most importantly, in terms of the current controver-
sy, the SEC requires foreign companies to report their financial
data in accordance with U.S. GAAP. It is the combination of
securities liability, a high level of disclosure, and the tedious and
expensive process of reconciling accounting with U.S. GAAP that
deters foreign companies from listing on U.S. exchanges.
Most foreign companies register with the SEC on Form F-i
for offerings and Form 20-F for listings.8 2 These forms are
essentially the same. 3 The "heart and soul" of the forms is a
prospectus.84 From the standpoint of both investors and issuers,
the most important portion of the prospectus is a discussion of
the company's financial statements, related financial information,
and risk factors.8"
Both forms require audited balance sheets for two fiscal years,
statements of income, cash flow reports, and reports of changes in
shareholders' equity.8 6 The two main obstacles to satisfying the
requirements of these forms are the availability and the sensitivity
of the information. 7 Most foreign companies use the accounting
standards of their home countries in their ordinary business
affairs, and must therefore generate an audited reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP.88  Reconciliation includes a discussion of the
differences between the two standards as they affect net income
and shareholders' equity.8 9
80 See James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of
International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 159-65
(1992).
81 See Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal Considerations Affecting Global
Offerings Shares in Foreign Companies, at 609 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 907, 1995).
82 See Decker, supra note 50, at S16.
3 See id.
84 Id. at S17.
85 See id.
86 See id. at S17-18.
87 See id. at S18.
88 See id.
89 See id. Rule 4.01(a)(2) of Regulation S-X, which applies to both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, requires foreign private issuers to either
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Both conformance to and reconciliation with U.S. GAAP can
be very difficult. Conceptually, this problem is the result of
accounting standards that are designed to achieve different goals
and to serve in different business environments. Accounting
standards also are often developed in keeping with home-country
tax law. Even in the United States, where accounting standards
are designed by a private organization, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board,9° the standards are tailored to fit U.S. tax
laws.91  In other countries, such as Japan, the government
promulgates accounting standards which likewise reflect home-
country tax regulations.92
Gathering the information necessary to produce the forms in
accordance with U.S. GAAP is a "truly formidable task" that has
the potential to be both time consuming and very expensive.93
Some of the information might not even be available. 4 It is this
task that many commentators believe deters foreign companies
from listing in the United States and forces non-U.S. companies
to other, less regulated, non-U.S. exchanges.
Once the initial registration and reporting requirements are
completed, the Exchange Act still requires companies to report on
a semi-annual basis. 5 All of these disclosures must be made in
prepare their financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP or reconcile
ome-country accounting principles with U.S. accounting standards, disclosing
and discussing the major differences between the two. See 17 C.F.R. S 210.4-
01(a)(2) (1995). Note that even a Rule 144A transaction requires at least a
verbal explanation of the differences in accounting standards, although Rule
144A issuers are not required to quantify them. See McConnell, supra note 4,
at S125. Moreover, other accounting standards vary from U.S. GAAP in more
than just technical detail - they also involve conceptual differences. See id. at
S123. One such example is the system chosen for inflation accounting. See id.
at S124. Another accounting aspect that generates concern is the means for
discussing transactions which are not seen in U.S. business, such as government
grants or government concessions (e.g., the Mexican government uses grants
and concessions to encourage infrastructure improvement). See id. at S126.
o See Hicks, supra note 22, at 798.
9' See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 4, at 41.
92 See Hicks, supra note 22, at 799.
9' McConnell, supra note 4, at S126-27.
94 See id. at S127. The information that is most likely to be missing is
certain footnote disclosures. See id. Footnote disclosures include items such as
market value of investments on a historical basis, historical property, and plant
and equipment data. See id.
9' Domestic companies are required to report quarterly, but an exception
is made for foreign companies. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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accordance with U.S. GAAP 6 The burden of these subsequent
disclosures, however, is not as great as with the original filing
because the foreign company can maintain its financial informa-
tion using U.S. GAAP on a current basis without having to
reconcile or refigure old information.
2.4. Recent Improvements for Foreign Issuers
Although the SEC has been unwilling to exempt foreign
issuers from the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Acts
and the concomitant reconciliation with U.S. GAAP, it has taken
some steps to facilitate U.S. securities listings by non-U.S.
companies. Indeed, some commentators have stated that in terms
of the SEC's willingness to accommodate and help foreign issuers,
there has never been a better time to list in the United States.9
In 1993, the SEC made it easier for foreign companies to
conduct offerings by reducing the public float requirement for the
F-3 short form (an alternative to the lengthier F-1 form) from
$300 million to $75 million.98 The SEC estimates that this
change will increase the number of issuers eligible to use the short
form by one-third.9  In addition, the SEC has lightened the
disclosure burden by changing forms F-i, F-2, F-3, and 20-F.1°°
Foreign issuers are now able to disclose less information than U.S.
Foreign companies also are exempt from the proxy requirements of § 14 and
the short-swing profit regulations of § 16 of the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R.
240.3a12-3.
96 See id. S 210.4-01(a).
' See Davis, supra note 10, at 112 (noting that the "SEC has become much
more issuer-friendly"); Kosnik, supra note 2, at S98 (noting that it is the
author's experience at the SEC as Associate Director of the Office of
International Corporate Finance that the last several years have produced "a
dramatically different attitude toward regulating foreign issuers"); McConnell,
supra note 4, at S127 (noting that in the author's experience, the SEC is very
flexible with regard to historical data missing from footnote disclosures);
Roquette, supra note 8, at 570 (stating that "the SEC has acknowledged the
need for flexibility").
" See Davis, supra note 10, at 112. Public float is the volume of publicly
traded shares of a security. See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 140.
" See Davis, supra note 10, at 112; Kosnik, supra note 2, at S103. Note that
this change only makes the initial registration form shorter and does not ease
the burden of reconciliation with U.S. GAAP or the subsequent requirements
under the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. S 239.33 (1995).
'00 See Roquette, supra note 8, at 573.
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issuers would have to disclose.10 For example, foreign issuers
may be able to withhold information regarding management
compensation.10 2  These changes, however, do not reduce the
burden of reconciliation with U.S. GAAP.
Foreign companies have more leeway in reporting frequency.
Although domestic companies are required to submit quarterly
financial reports under the Exchange Act, foreign companies need
only submit semiannual reports and provide information that they
release in their home country'3 Rule 3-19 of Regulation S-X
sets requirements for the age of financial statements of foreign
issuers.' ° Rule 3-19 previously required that the statements be not
more than six months old,105 which took away some of the
benefits conferred by not having to file Form 10-Q. Recently,
however, the SEC has extended the age to ten months, thus easing
the burden on foreign companies." 6
In addition to the minor technical changes, the SEC has made
two more substantive changes in an effort to attract foreign
issuers. These changes are implemented by Rule 144A'07 and by
a multi-jurisdictional disclosure system with Canada ("MJDS"). 08
The MJDS allows Canadian companies to meet most U.S.
disclosure requirements by following Canadian law.1  This
system is obviously very appealing: if the SEC expanded the
scope of the MJDS to include European and Japanese companies,
for example, the current debate would not exist because compa-
nies would not have to comply with U.S. securities laws. The
Canadian disclosure system and the Canadian accounting princi-
ples, however, are very similar to those found in the United
101 See id. at 574.
102 See id.
103 See 17 C.F.R. SS 240.13a-16, 249.306.
" See id. S 210.3-19; Kosnik, supra note 2, at S102. Regulation S-X applies
to both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. S 210.
105 See Kosnik, supra note 2, at S102.
10" See id.; 17 C.F.R. S 210.3-19(b), (c).
107 See 17 C.F.R. S 230.144A (1992).
"'S Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification to the Current
Registration and Reporting S stem for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release
No. 6902, Exchange Act Release No. 29,354, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036-01 (uly 1,
1991).
109 This rule is limited to "substantial issuers," which are those companies
meeting certain requirements in terms of total capitalization and public market
float. See Roquette, supra note 8, at 576 n.46.
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States.1 ° Other countries are less like the United States, and it
is unlikely that the MJDS will be extended to other countries any
time soon."' Rule 144A was designed to allow trade in private-
ly placed, and hence unregistered, securities.112  Although Rule
144A may attract foreign issuers to the United States,"' it only
impacts the private market, and thus will not increase the number
of publicly listed companies.
3. CONFLICT
3.1. Costs and Benefits
Before introducing the positions for and against relaxing listing
standards for foreign companies, it is important to appreciate the
factors that foreign companies consider when deciding where to
conduct offerings or where to trade their securities. This section
presents a brief overview of the economic framework of securities
markets. First, companies are attracted to markets where capital
is available and where there is a liquid secondary market. This
reflects the elementary economic principles of supply and demand.
The United States has traditionally been a very attractive market
because of its great supply of capital and large trading volume.
114
In fact, the recent trend towards privatization often involves
companies that are so large, and which require so much capital,
that the United States is the only market to which the country
Can turn.
115
On a more comprehensive level, it is a well-established
economic principle that in order for capital markets to function
110 See id. at 576-77.
1 See id.
112 See 17 C.F.R. 5 230.144A (1992).
11 There is much debate over the efficacy of these programs, specifically
Rule 144A. See Strauss, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that Rule 144A has
fizzled); Vickie Kokkalenios, Increasing U.S. Investment in Foreign Securities: An
Evaluation of SECRule 144A, 17 FORDHAM INT'L. LJ. S179 (1994) (concluding
that amendments to Rule 144A are necessary).
114 See James R. Silkenat, Overview of U.S. Securities Markets and Foreign
Issuers, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S4 (1994).
115 See generally id. at S4 (explaining the attractiveness of U.S. markets to
foreign companies and addressing questions that foreign companies face
concerning U.S. markets).
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efficiently investors must have company-specific information. 116
Investors need to have sufficient information to allow them to
make calculations regarding the relative risk and return of the
companies available for investment. At any given level of risk, a
certain return must be offered relative to the market. Capital is
distributed efficiently when the expected return, discounted by the
risk factor, is maximized. An investor can select return-maximiz-
ing securities only when she has access to information regarding
these factors.
1 7
An exchange with no regulation and no disclosure require-
ments is very favorable to issuers, who are not required to make
potentially sensitive disclosures, file costly financial reports, or
face potential liability for fraudulent or misleading statements or
insider trading. An exchange with extremely strict regulations is
very favorable to investors, who are provided with all of the
disclosure they desire and are fully protected from insider trading
and fraud. Investors will not trade on the ideal issuer
exchange,11 8 however, because investors will not have access to
information about the companies and their securities. Similarly,
issuers will not - all else being equal - list on the ideal investor
exchange if they have an alternative market.
The most economically efficient market lies between the two
extremes. Depending upon how a given regulatory framework
balances the interests of investors and issuers, the gains to
investors from more detailed disclosure requirements may exceed
the cost to issuers of producing that information; alternatively, the
gains to issuers from not having to disclose may exceed the loss to
investors119
From the investor's standpoint, information is a good. If an
investor can choose between two exchanges with companies
offering equal risks and returns, the investor will not choose the
market prone to higher levels of fraud, manipulation, or unfair-
ness. 2 The investor will discount the price of the security in
116 See generally Cox, supra note 80, at 158-64 (explaining the economics of
efficient capital markets).
117 See id. at 161-62.
118 "Ideal" is a relative term. Obviously a market with no investors is not
ideal; this hypothetical exchange is ideal in terms of expense only.
119 See Cox, supra note 80, at 161-62.
120 See id. at 159.
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each market by the likelihood of misconduct.12 ' Therefore,
stocks will trade at somewhat higher prices on the more regulated
market. This does not mean, however, that investors will always
choose to invest in the more regulated market. If stocks that
trade only on the less regulated market offer higher risk-adjusted
returns than those available in the more regulated market, then
the investor will choose the stocks on the less regulated exchang-
es.122 This is one of the reasons why U.S. investors are turning
to the markets in foreign countries in spite of the fact that the
U.S. securities market offers them more protection than any other
market in the world.123
A basic tenet of financial market economics is that if the
marginal cost of additional disclosure requirements equals the
marginal benefit from the disclosures, issuers and investors alike
will be indifferent as to where they conduct their business. 24
Applying this economic truism to the U.S. regulatory system, if
the extra disclosures required in the United States do not exceed
the additional benefits of the disclosure, then - all else being
equal - investors and issuers will be indifferent between securities
traded in New York or London.12
Until recently, the U.S. securities markets did not face any
substantial competition.1 26 Consequently, the SEC could require
high levels of disclosure without jeopardizing U.S. competitive-
ness. Internationalization, however, has changed the face of
securities regulation dramatically. As the above economic analysis
reveals, the United States can expect to lose foreign stock listings
to other countries if the costs of listing in the United States
exceed the benefits. Thus, while in the past the SEC did not have
to concern itself with economics, it now has no choice but to
consider the market implications of its actions."
121 See id.
122 See id. at 159-60.
'23 See discussion supra section 2.1.2.
124 See Cox, supra note 80, at 160. This principle also can be applied to
trade within the United States - a marginal cost/benefit analysis determines
whether a company chooses to have its securities trade in the pink sheet
market, on an exchange, or on NASDAQ.
125 See id.
126 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
121 See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 7.
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3.2. The Status Quo
Richard Breeden, Chairman of the SEC between 1989-1993,
has said that the listing requirement issue is not "about the
profitability of the New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, or
the other American exchanges ... , [or] about how many deals
the brokers have to offer ... [r]ather, this ... is an issue of values
and fundamental principles. 1 2 ' According to Breeden, the very
reason the United States has been able to establish such a
successful exchange is the high level of confidence that the public
has in the honesty and integrity of the market.
1 29
Public confidence in the market is important because "people
do not participate in markets where they think they are likely to
get cheated." 130  In response to the argument that regulation is
not necessary because the market will adjust prices to reflect the
likelihood of cheating, 3 supporters of the high level of disclo-
sure required by U.S. securities regulations point out that even
assuming this theory holds true, the problem is that the prices of
both honest companies and dishonest companies will reflect the
discount. Consequently, the cost of capital to all market partici-
pants rises, even though only a few companies are dishonest.
1 12
As an illustration, consider a company trading in Germany, a
market that has historically been subject to very little regulation.
"2 Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a
Time of Economic Transformation, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L. L.J. S77, S78-79 (1994)
[hereinafter Foreign Companies].
129 See id at S81.
13 Id. at S82.
This theory is put forth by some economists, although this extreme is
accepted by a rather small circle centered in the University of Chicago. Most
economists believe that there is at least some minimum level of disclosure that
should be mandatory. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for
"Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488
(1970). This view is a reflection of three concepts. First, there is the "lemons
problem," meaning that a few lemons (less than scrupulous companies) will
make investors wary and raise capital costs for all companies, not just the
dishonest ones. See id. (introducing the concept of the "lemons problem").
Second, given that disclosures are necessary - investors need information in
order to invest - mandatory disclosures place the burden on the issuer, who
can provide the information at the least cost. See Cox, supra note 80, at 161-62.
Third, mandatory disclosures prevent investors from over-investing in research
(this concept is closely related to the second concept). See id.
132 See, e.g., Foreign Companies, supra note 128, at S82.
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One trait of the German accounting system is that companies are
allowed to maintain reserve funds that allow companies to engage
in "profit smoothing."133  Therefore, an individual investing in
Germany will discount the price of German-listed companies to
reflect the chance that a company may not be reporting its
earnings accurately. The stock of all German companies is
discounted to reflect the uncertainty caused by the hidden reserves
even though many companies do not engage in profit smoothing.
The discount means that everyone is forced to pay higher costs of
capital than they would in a more efficiently priced market.
Thus, mandatory disclosures often result in efficiency gains,
making the United States' highly regulated market appealing to
issuers.
Proponents of the current system also present an empirical
argument that the United States continues to attract a great
volume of capital in spite of its high level of disclosure.1 34 The
U.S. capital market is the largest in the world, and proponents of
the diclosure system submit that the United States has more
investors, greater liquidity, and more foreign offerings than any
other country because of its firm commitment to providing
investors with the highest level of disclosures possible and to
maintaining openness and integrity in the market.1 35 According
to Richard Breeden, the relevant question is "[i]f you're scoring a
touchdown every time your team gets its hands on the ball, is that
the time to radically change the rules of the game?"
136
Although investor protection was, and still is, the primary goal
of the U.S. securities laws, 137 the question of permitting different
standards for foreign companies implicates additional objectives.
One such objective is to maintain equal treatment for domestic
companies. If U.S. companies have to disclose certain facts using
U.S. GAAP rules, then so should foreign companies. 3 ' Foreign
companies building factories in the United States have to follow
13 Profit smoothing occurs when companies under-report earnings in good
years, reserving that money to bolster earnings in bad years. See Roberta S.
Karmel, Living with U.S. Regulations: Complying with the Rules and Avoiding
Litigation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S152, S155 1994).
134 See Foreign Companies, supra note 128, at S84-85.
135 See id. at S83-85.
136 Id. at S85.
137 See id. at S83.
138 See id. at S87-90.
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U.S. environmental laws, not those of their home country,139 so
why should securities laws be any different?
A final concern results from a long-standing U.S. policy that
investors should be able to compare companies across industries
and without regard for geography.14 Requiring reconciliation
with U.S. GAAP allows investors to make meaningful compari-
sons across national boundaries. If the SEC permitted foreign
companies to use home country accounting standards, some argue
that investors would not be able to compare companies properly
when deciding where to invest.
141
3.3. Arguments for Modification
Some critics of the present system support modifying the
application of the securities laws to foreign companies: 42
[R]egulations that require reformulation of foreign earnings
data to meet U.S. accounting standards may offer little, if
any, protection to U.S. investors . ... Such regulations
can also harm the international competitiveness of the U.S.
securities industry if they prevent U.S. exchanges from
making markets in many of the largest corporations in the
world.143
Many commentators see a need to "find some compromise
whereby an issuer like Nestle can move out of an over-the-counter
electronic pink sheet market, which has no volume reporting and
no real time quotes, to a listed market - NYSE, NASDAQ, or
AMEX - which has more effective overall regulation, without
requiring U.S. GAAP reconciliation."144
139 See id. at S88.
140 See id.
141 See id. at S88-89.
142 Some commentators see the complete overhaul of the U.S. securities
laws as necessary to the continued success of the U.S. financial market. See,
e.g., Cox, supra note 80 (discussing the need for a wholesale revolution in
domestic securities laws). This is an argument, however, that &oes beyond the
scope of this Comment, which suggests a more moderate, possibly temporary,
solution. See discussion infra section 4.
14 Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 4, at 39.
144 Cochrane, supra note 66, at S61.
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Supporters of the status quo believe that the United States
already has a regulatory system that will permit it to maintain its
current position as the world's preeminent financial market.14
Those who support change, however, believe that the current
rules incur costs greater than the benefits they provide to
investors, and that as globalization of the world's financial
markets continues, the forces of competition will keep issuers
away from the U.S. market.
146
The international competitiveness argument flows directly
from the economic basics introduced in the previous subsection.
As other financial markets improve, in terms of both regulation
and cdpital availability, any extra costs that exceed the benefits
produced by those expenditures will force issuers to foreign
exchanges or into the U.S. pink sheet market.' 47 Reconciliation
with U.S. GAAP, the argument goes, is such a cost.14  Modifi-
cation of the existing system is necessary in order to compete with
foreign countries for listings.
149
In addition to the international competitiveness argument,
some argue that investors cannot invest easily in foreign stocks.
According to William Donaldson, a former chairman of the
NYSE, U.S. investors are "'missing out on some 2,500 foreign
companies that would qualify to list on the NYSE. 50  Many
of these stocks offer investors the opportunity to seek greater rates
of return than are available in the United States.' 5 ' Even if the
average foreign security is more risky than the average U.S.
security, the foreign securities still offer investors the ability to
diversify their portfolios.5 2 These benefits are not as readily
145 See supra notes 12841 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 4; Cochrane, supra note 66;
Edwards, supra note 67.
147 See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
18 See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 4; Cochrane, supra note 66; Edwards,
supra note 67.
149 See id.
150 Strauss, supra note 10, at 17; see also Cochrane, supra note 66, at S61
(suggesting that the addition of 40 companies to the NYSE is negligible in view
of an estimated 2,000 foreign companies that would be eligible to list were it
not for the SEC regulations requiring U.S. GAAP disclosure).
151 See discussion supra section 2.1.2.
152 For a discussion of the benefits of trading in markets that are only
loosely correlated with one another, see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying
text.
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available under the current regulatory regime.
One of the common arguments for allowing foreign issuers to
list on the U.S. exchanges without U.S. GAAP reconciliation is
that investors purchase foreign stocks anyway, either directly in
the foreign market or, more often, through the use of ADRs
traded in the pink sheet market. Thus, proponents of change
argue that the current SEC rules do not protect investors, but
rather force investors into less regulated, more expensive mar-
kets. l"3 Because investors want to add foreign stocks to their
portfolios, institutional investors generally have to turn to
overseas exchanges,- 4 while retail investors must resort to the
pink sheet market.
1 5
Being forced to use foreign exchanges and the pink sheet
market makes trading much more expensive than trading in listed
stocks on the U.S exchanges or on NASDAQ. In foreign
countries, investors face considerably higher brokerage fees and
are forced to pay higher bid-ask spreads.15 6  There also are
higher clearance, settlement, and custody costs.1 17  These costs
raise another concern, namely that these greater expenses are paid
to foreign brokers rather than to U.S. brokers.158  Investing in
the pink sheet markets is likewise more expensive. William
Donaldson estimates that U.S. investors are forced to pay from
eight to ten percent more than they would pay for listed
stocks."5 9 Thus, investors are forced to trade in a relatively
illiquid and costly market, as opposed to the heavily analyzed and
liquid market for U.S.-listed securities.
Another contention of those who favor changing the current
regulations is that the SEC relies on the incorrect assumption that
foreign securities markets are less price efficient than the U.S.
market."s In other words, the SEC believes that the prices of
153 See Edwards, supra note 67, at 64.
154 Although institutional investors are the primary purchasers of foreign
securities, retail investors are indirectly hurt by the higher costs. See id. Many
of the institutional purchases are made by pension funds and mutual funds, and
the costs are passedon to individuals. See id.
155 See Cochrane, supra note 66, at S61.
156 See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 4, at 43.
17 See id. at 42.
158 See id.
159 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 18.
160 See Edwards, supra note 67, at 64.
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foreign securities are less likely to reflect the future earnings
potential of foreign firms due to the different disclosure rules.' 6'
This, however, is not necessarily so. First, it may be that some
of the disclosures required by the SEC are not beneficial to
investors. That is, it may be that not all of the disclosures
required in the United States are necessary to effect efficient
prices. Just because one country does not require certain
disclosures does not mean that the prices of securities in that
country will be less likely to reflect the earning potential of the
companies the securities represent. Second, in response to the
argument that inaccurate pricing will prevent investors from
making informed choices, proponents of change insist that while
U.S. investors may not be able to allocate funds between a U.S.
company and a European company, they at least will be able to
allocate funds efficiently between two European companies. 62
Thus, if U.S. investors want to invest a certain percentage of their
portfolios in foreign securities in order to increase their portfolios'
diversity, they can choose efficiently between the companies that
are to comprise that percentage.
It also is worth noting that different countries have different
industrial and corporate structures, which may influence the
efficiency of stock prices even without government regulatory
intervention. In many countries, large owners play a more
significant role than they do in the United States and consequent-
ly, stocks in these countries may be even more efficiently priced
than those in the United States.163 Unlike in the United States,
where banks are rarely major sources of capital,1" German
companies have a history of obtaining much of their funding from
large lenders.1 6  Consequently, lenders have had significant
influence and access to information that allows them to value the
company and determine the security of their lending transactions,
which may therefore enable the market to arrive at efficient
prices.
A related contention is that even if information is translated
into U.S. GAAP, investors still will not be able to compare
161 See id. at 60.
162 See id. at 65.
163 See id.
164 See Karmel, supra note 133, at S155.
165 See id.
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companies across national boundaries because different countries
have different business practices. 166  Assuming that accounting
standards are a reflection of these differences, translating home
country accounting figures into U.S. GAAP figures will provide
only the illusion of comparability. Some even doubt that it is
possible to compare U.S. companies accurately.16 Even with
the same accounting standards there is considerable flexibility
within the system, and hence a comparison of information
provided by IBM and Exxon is not a comparison of apples to
apples but apples to oranges.16 ' This concern is magnified when
financial data is from a foreign company. Investors may find
themselves misled due to their misinterpretation of the data. 69
Then again, investors might prove to be more sophisticated.
In fact, some commentators doubt that potentially misleading
foreign accounting procedures, such as reserve accounting, actually
mislead investors. 70 In the United States, companies sometimes
"devote enormous ingenuity to the task of manipulating earnings
reported to stockholders... by 'creative accounting' - that is, by
choosing accounting methods which stabilize and increase
reported earnings."171 A number of studies have concluded,
however, that cosmetic changes undertaken to make a company
appear to have had a more profitable quarter than it actually had
are largely futile.'72 In fact, the changes sometimes backfire in
the long-run and result in stock price depreciation because
investors are prone to conclude that such changes are a sign of
financial weakness.' One might therefore conclude that
companies that use techniques such as income smoothing will be
appropriately valued by investors. Furthermore, analysts who
track foreign securities tend to rely more on financial statements
based on the company's home country accounting standards than
on U.S. GAAP-reconciled reports.174
1' See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 4, at 42.
167 See id.
168 See Cochrane, supra note 66, at 566.
169 See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 4, at 50.
170 See id. at 46-48.
i7 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 27, at 305.
172 See id. at 305-07.
173 See id. at 306.
174 See Cochrane, supra note 66, at S62.
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In response to the SEC's contention that allowing foreign
firms to list on the exchanges and NASDAQ with less than full
compliance is unfair to domestic companies, proponents of change
argue that in addition to being necessary, such listing is not unfair,
and it will not be perceived as so unfair that U.S. companies
would protest change.17 1 One high-level NYSE official claims
that a large percentage of CEOs are reasonably objective and are
prepared to accept changes that help maintain the strength of the
U.S. securities markets, even though they do think such excep-
tions would be slightly unfair. 76 Other commentators point
out that U.S. issuers often can list their securities on foreign
exchanges on an equal footing with domestic issuers.1"" More-
over, the biggest hurdle is changing to U.S. GAAP, not maintain-
ing an accounting system that operates under U.S. GAAP
principles. China, for example, is implementing sophisticated
accounting procedures for the first time, and many Chinese
companies are choosing to utilize U.S. GAAP.17 1 U.S. compa-
nies have similarly "grown up" with U.S. accounting principles.
In contrast, foreign companies from countries with established
accounting systems - the United Kingdom, for example - have
to reconcile financial data with an accounting system different
from their own.179 This means foreign issuers have an addition-
al burden: it does not seem inherently unfair that such burden is
lessened or even eliminated.
Another argument is that the fairness concern implicitly
assumes that the U.S. GAAP disclosures are not optimal - that
they are not worth their expense. If U.S. GAAP is valuable to
U.S. investors, then given a choice between two otherwise
equivalent companies, they will be willing to pay more for
securities of issuers whose financial data was produced using U.S.
accounting standards. Domestic companies will thus enjoy a
lower cost of capital relative to the foreign issuers that only
provide disclosures using home country accounting standards. 80
175 See id. at S62-63.
176 See id.
177 See id. at S63.
178 See id. at S64.
179 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
180 See Edwards, supra note 67, at 69.
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4. "ARE WE GOING TO LOOK BACK FIvE OR SIX YEARS
FROM Now AND SAY WE MISSED THE BUS?"
181
Both sides of the debate have the same goal: maintenance of
the highly successful, highly profitable, U.S. securities market.
The differences between the two sides result from their respective
beliefs over how to achieve this goal. The United States must
remain competitive, but it must also avoid a shortsighted "race to
the bottom."
1 2
A quick look at the U.S. pink sheet market supports the
notion that disclosures are valuable to investors and issuers alike.
Nestle, a Swiss food-maker,"8 trades in the U.S. pink sheet
market, and therefore is not required to make any significant
disclosures. Nonetheless, over the course of the past few years
Nestle* has voluntarily provided investors with an increasing
amount of information.4 Although Nestle does not provide
sufficient U.S. GAAP-based information to meet the demands of
the Exchange Act, its increased level of disclosures has helped
increase its trading volume in the United States.' U.S. inves-
tors now own fifteen percent of Nestle's equity.186 Many other
foreign companies likewise have begun to provide more informa-
tion to investors. 8 As investors are able to learn more and
more about a company, the company's cost of capital goes down
because the discount resulting from investors' lack of information
is reduced, increasing the price the company is able to command
for its stock.'
A similar trend is seen on many foreign exchanges, which are
increasing disclosure requirements for listed companies. In
Europe, the European Economic Community is working to
181 Cochrane, supra note 66, at S59.
182 See Cox, supra note 80, at 163-64. The so-called "race to the bottom"
theory is that competition between exchanges could lead to fewer and fewer
disclosure requirements, eventually leaving all of the exchanges with suboptimal
levels of regulations. See id.
.83 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
184 See Glasgall & Lindorff, supra note 11, at 102.
185 See id.
196 See Davis, supra note 10, at 112.
187 See id.
18 See discussion supra section 3.1.
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harmonize exchange rules among member nations."8 9 Germany
in particular has been adding disclosure and other require-
ments190 to what historically has been a largely unregulated
exchange.191 Switzerland, whose markets traditionally have been
nearly as unregulated as those in Germany, also is seeking to
improve its competitive position by improving disclosure
requirements.'92
The actions of foreign issuers and foreign exchanges imply that
the level of disclosures in some - perhaps many - foreign
countries is below the competitive equilibrium. Companies are
releasing more information in order to compete with other
companies for capital. Exchanges are pressed to increase mandato-
ry disclosures in order to compete with other exchanges for
listings. Increasing levels of disclosure in foreign countries and in
the U.S. pink sheet market do not necessarily indicate, however,
that the U.S. securities laws require an optimal level of disclosure.
All that can be drawn from the activities in the market over the
last few years is that some ideal level of mandatory disclosure
exists. The United States has not found the perfect mix. Indeed,
given that viable alternatives to the U.S. securities exchanges have
only recently developed and that the historical lack of competition
allowed the SEC to pursue a goal of nearly complete investor
protection even if that came at the risk that the disclosures would
cost the issuers more than they would benefit investors, it seems
unlikely that the United States would have arrived at the
equilibrium point. Other countries are probably underregulated
from a competitive standpoint, but this does not mean that the
United States is not overregulated.
Perhaps the most powerful argument for the status quo is that
the United States is still home to the world's most successful
securities markets, and although issuers do turn to foreign
exchanges and the pink sheet market, they also are listing on the
exchanges and NASDAQ in record numbers. Supporters of the-
status quo, although acknowledging that the pink sheet market is
home to more issuers than the exchanges or NASDAQ, point out
that a study of the ratio of the growth of nonreporting ADRs to
89 See Roquette, supra note 8, at 587-90.
190 See id. at 611-12.
191 See id. at 572.
1 See Cox, supra note 80, at 158 n.2.
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reporting ADRs shows that in relative terms there is parity.
These numbers, however, do not support the proposition that the
SEC's current regulations and insistence on GAAP draws issuers
to the United States. In fact, the numbers suggest that it is not
the regulatory system that has such a powerful draw, but rather
a wealth of U.S. investors who have money and a desire to invest
it. If the regulations were the primary attraction, the United
States would have witnessed a preference for the exchanges, but it
has not.
There are several ways to address the conflict over U.S.
regulation of U.S.-traded foreign securities. One option would be
to do nothing - preserve the status quo and hope that the U.S.
financial industry does not go the way of the automobile or the
consumer electronics industry.193 Another option would be to
allow all foreign companies to list on the U.S. exchanges and
NASDAQ, provided that they comply with their home country
securities laws - but this is a radical suggestion urged by almost
no one. An ideal option would be to establish international
accounting standards and possibly even international disclosure
standards. Indeed, the International Accounting Standards
Committee is currently working to formulate international
accounting standards. 94 Unfortunately, given the number of
years that it took to establish the MJDS with Canada, a country
with disclosure and accounting standards similar to the United
States, international accounting and disclosure standards are
unlikely to be realized any time soon. 95
The NYSE has proposed that companies that qualify as
"world-class" companies196 be allowed to trade on the U.S. ex-
changes and NASDAQ under relaxed standards. 97  Issuers
would still be required to register securities in accordance with
193 See Edwards, supra note 67, at 62 (observing that "[o]nly a short time
ago many [Americans] believed that the United State's [sic] dominant positions
in automobiles, electronics, computers, and other industries were impregnable").
194 See Cochrane, supra note 66, at S65.
195 See Roquette, supra note 8, at 575.
i96 "World-class" companies are those companies with five billion dollars
in revenues, market capital of two billion dollars, an average weekly trading
volume of one million dollars or 200,000 shares, substantial foreign share
ownership, and which are listed on at least one major world exchange in
addition to their home country's exchanges. See Cochrane, supra note 66, at
S63; Edwards, supra note 67, at 59.
97 See Edwards, supra note 67, at 59.
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U.S. disclosure requirements, but they would not be required to
reconcile with U.S. GAAP if the disclosures include a written
explanation of any material differences between home-country
accounting standards and U.S. GAAP. 98 A similar approach
would be to create a bifurcated exchange that recognizes the
sophistication of institutional investors and allows them to trade
in exchange-listed foreign companies without full regulatory
compliance. 99 Another approach would be to allow foreign
issuers to list without full compliance if the listing indicates that
the company does not follow U.S. GAAP.
None of these solutions address the concern that different
requirements for domestic and foreign issuers disadvantages U.S.
companies. Although it is clear that the United States faces
international competition for stock listings, it is not so clear that
allowing foreign issuers to list on U.S. exchanges without
reconciliation with U.S. GAAP would in fact disadvantage
domestic issuers. U.S. issuers can list their securities on foreign
exchanges without changing their accounting standards. Further-
more, U.S. companies have always utilized U.S. GAAP, while
foreign companies must undergo expensive and time-consuming
procedures to comply with the U.S. standards. If the United
States declines to force the foreign issuers to play catch-up with
domestic issuers, this should not be perceived as dramatically
unfair to domestic companies. Finally, any slight unfairness is
justified in order to preserve the United States' competitive
position and to permit U.S. investors greater access to foreign
securities.
There is a strong case to be made for completely overhauling
the U.S. securities regulations,2"° but that is an argument beyond
the scope of this Comment. It is likely that the SEC needs to
undertake an intensive economic analysis supported by empirical
studies to determine the efficiency of the U.S. securities laws.
Until that time, this Comment suggests that change is necessary.
The United States should not wait to see if it loses yet another
industry to international competition. By the time the United
198 See Cochrane, supra note 66, at S61-62.
199 See id. at S62; Strauss, supra note 10, at 17-18.
200 See generally Cox, supra note 80, at 157 (arguing for a "wholesale
revolution in domestic securities laws"); MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES
REGULATIONS, supra note 1 (containing a collection of articles on U.S.
securities regulations from economic and legal perspectives).
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States realizes that it has set its regulations at non-competitive
levels, it may be too late.2 '
This Comment argues that in the interest of international
competition, the United States should experiment with different
regulations. 2 2  First, a bifurcated listing system should be
created whereby, at a minimum, institutional investors are allowed
to trade in "world class" stocks. The United States should begin
by allowing world-class companies to trade on the U.S. exchanges
and NASDAQ but should permit only institutional investors to
invest in them.
If this is insufficient to attract issuers - that is, if issuers
cannot be enticed solely by access to institutional investors - the
SEC should allow retail investors access to the exchange but
should maintain a distinct boundary between the foreign and
domestic market.2 3 The SEC is worried that a scandal in which
investors were misled by foreign accounting methods could
severely harm investor confidence in the U.S. market, but by
maintaining a distinction between the two types of listings, any
loss in investor confidence could likely be contained to the market
for foreign listings.2 °4 This is not a radical solution, but rather
a moderate accommodation that will give the SEC time to
evaluate its regulations. This solution provides a means of
preventing any irrecoverable loss in the global capital market
201 See Cochrane, supra note 66, at S58 (stating that "if we do not make the
regulatory changes that will allow U.S. exchanges to fully participate in the
growth of international trading, this . . . may undermine the preeminence
among world capital markets that the U.S. capital market now enjoys");
Edwards, supra note 67, at 59 (stating that "in the next few years toreign
exchanges could gain an irrevocable advantage").
202 See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 8-9. Grundfest suggests making changes
on a limited basis and observing their effects in an effort to improve the
functioning of the securities market. See id. His suggestions a ply to deciding
whether to disclose and how to disclose, as well as other regulatory concerns.
See id. Grundfest draws an analogy to the decision by the Department of
Treasury to engage in a year-long experiment using a new technique for
auctioning U.S. Treasury Securities. See id.
203 Of course, any foreign issuers who fully comply with the U.S. securities
regulations will be able to move to the domestic listings.
204 Note that the exchanges have proved resilient in the past. Although the
stock market had its last big crash in 1987, investor confidence has been quite
high since then. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 31 (discussing the U.S. securities
markets' recent spectacular growth).
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without jeopardizing the fruits of the current regulatory require-
ments.
5. CONCLUSION
The United States has developed highly successful securities
markets, and the value of the U.S. securities regulations - as well
as the efforts of the SEC - in creating this system is undeniable.
The U.S. system, however, has developed with a bias towards
investor protection, and while the lack of international competi-
tion once meant that this bias could be maintained without
prejudicing the U.S. markets relative to foreign securities markets,
the world is now a different place. The significance of institution-
al investors has supplanted that of retail investors, and the world
has witnessed a major trend towards the internationalization of
securities markets. The SEC must be alert to these changes and
should take steps to lessen the burden on foreign issuers that want
to list on the U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ. The SEC should
begin by allowing institutional investors to trade in companies
that are required to comply with the pertinent securities regula-
tions but are not required to undertake reconciliation with U.S.
GAAP - information prepared under home-country accounting
standards should suffice. If this change is not sufficient, the SEC
should consider allowing access to the same market by retail
investors. Finally, the SEC should be mindful of economics and
evaluate the current regulations with the knowledge that if the
U.S. markets are not competitive, they will not survive.
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